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Abstract 
This paper analyses the impact of the Italian Startup Act which entered into force in December 
2012. This public policy provides a unique bundle of benefits, such as tax incentives, public loan 
guarantees, and a more flexible labor law, for firms registered as “innovative startups” in Italy. 
This legislation has been implemented by the Italian government to increase innovativeness of 
small and young enterprises by facilitating improved access to (external) capital and (high-
skilled) labor. Consequently, the goal of our evaluation is to assess the impact of the policy on 
equity, debt and employment. Using various conditional difference-in-difference models, we 
find that the Italian startup policy has met its primary objectives. The econometric results 
strongly suggest that firms operating under this program are more successful in obtaining equity 
and debt capital and they also hire more employees because of the program participation. 
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Small and young companies are often seen as the engine of innovation and growth but 
unfortunately these companies are also known to be the most financially constrained 
(Himmelberg & Peterson, 1994; Schneider & Veugelers, 2009). This argument is especially 
pertinent for newly founded, innovative firms (Carpenter & Petersen, 2002). Capital market 
imperfections in financing Research and Development (R&D) investments are usually put 
forward as a theoretical justification for public support to private R&D (Hall, 2002). There is 
a general tendency to consider R&D investments are riskier than other investments with 
negative consequences both for financing, as investors discount uncertainty, and for debt 
financing, since collateralization becomes problematic due to sunk costs and intangibles (Hall 
et al., 2016). Moreover, the problems of contract incompleteness and information asymmetry 
between firm and investors are exacerbated in the case of R&D financing (Hall & Lerner, 
2010). As a consequence, innovative firms rely more on their own internal finance, when 
available. Market failures in innovation can be particularly severe in countries that lack well-
functioning capital markets for innovative startups (Myers & Majluf, 1984).  
Italy, especially in the aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis followed by the 
economic recession and the sovereign debt crisis, can be considered as one of those countries 
where the functioning of the financial markets for innovative startups became highly 
debatable, at the very least. The recognition that the crisis might have hit innovative, small 
and young firms more severely than other companies called for policy actions, especially for 
disadvantaged but potentially highly important companies for technological advancement and 
economic growth (cf. OECD, 2009; OECD, 2014; and Bergner et al., 2017). 
As a response to the crisis, Italy passed the Decree Law 179/2012 transformed into 
Law 221/2012, which can be seen as an active high-tech startup policy. This policy scheme is 
a composite measure made of a set of complementary interventions aimed at unleashing the 
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growth potential of innovative young and small firms. Among other features, it combines 
investment tax benefits, public loan guarantees and a more flexible labor legislation as 
benefits for the program participants. 
The purpose of this paper is to take a first look at the effects of this newly designed, 
and in the context of science and technology policy, innovative program to incent startup 
activity and to enhance the growth potential of innovative companies. We apply state-of-the-
art econometric techniques to estimate treatment effects of the policy on relevant target 
performance measures at the firm-level. We mainly rely on difference-in-difference (DiD) 
regressions with adequate control group designs, but also address possible self-selection 
mechanisms and attrition.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data, 
Section 3 presents the empirical strategy, Section 4 shows results, and Section 5 concludes. 
1.1 Conceptual Background 
As already experimented across the world, industrial policies to be effective must target a 
specific population of firms. Targeted firms can be selected according to multiple criteria 
such as age, size, location, industry, R&D intensity, etc.  
The Italian law 221/2012, referred as Startup Act, is a remarkable example of the 
recent evolution of targeted industrial and innovative policy. Similar initiatives to support 
high-tech startup have been recently introduced in other countries such as: India (Companies 
Act 2013), Latvia (2016), Austria (startup program 2017) and Belgium (2017). 
The crucial role of young and small firms in job creation is widely supported (Davis 
et al., 1996 and Criscuolo et al., 2014). Empirical evidence generally confirms firm size and 
age to be negatively correlated with rates of job creation and firm growth (Birch, 1981; 
Buldyrev et al., 2020; Harhoff et al., 1998; Buldyrev et al., 2007; Headd & Kirchhoff, 2009; 
Haltiwanger et al., 2013). It has been found that firm births account for a significant share of 
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net job creation since firms do not grow much after an initial high growth period (Armington 
& Odle, 1982; Kirchhoff & Phillips, 1988; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1994; Broersma & 
Gautier, 1997; Voulgaris et al., 2005; Lotti, 2007). More importantly, it is noteworthy that not 
all small firms grow faster than larger firms but only some small and young firms: the so-
called “gazelles” (Delmar et al., 2003; Acs & Mueller, 2008). 
The contribution to innovation of the small business sector is another argument 
brought up in the literature and policy debate to support small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), even tough, as it is well known, there is no linear, monotonic relationship between 
firm size and innovativeness (see among others Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Symeonidis, 1996; 
Freel, 2005; Hausman, 2005; Lee & Sung, 2005; Laforet & Tann, 2006; Baregheh et al., 
2016). More compelling is the argument that financial constraints are particularly pronounced 
for SMEs: retrieving information on SMEs is more expensive, their securities are less 
frequently traded, and their financial statements do not have to be audited. The lack of assets 
to pledge as collateral is another problem of startups, particularly innovative newly founded 
firms centered around R&D activities. Information asymmetries between insiders and 
external potential investors and stakeholders are magnified by the overlap of ownership and 
management in most of the young and small firms. The theory thus suggests asymmetric 
information to induce an adverse selection, about debt financing. Empirical evidence indeed 
confirms that the problems above cause an insufficient provision of capital to young, 
innovative and small firms (Audretsch & Lehmann, 2004; Freel, 2007; Stucki, 2013; Duarte 
et al. 2016; Bergner et al., 2017).  
This is the main rationale of Law 221/2012 targeting the group of innovative, high-
growth and young small and micro firms in Italy, since they are the ones experiencing the 
highest demand for capital and featuring specific characteristics complicating the acquisition 
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of funds, especially during recessions (Gompers & Lerner, 2001; Audretsch & Lehmann, 
2004; North et al., 2013). 
 This policy is meant to contribute to filling the gap between Italy and other OECD 
countries regarding high-tech startups and high skilled labor force. Italy is well-known to be 
the country with the most considerable fraction of micro (< 10 employees) and small firms (< 
50 employees) among OECD countries. Also, small firms in Italy account for the most 
relevant share of total employment among OECD countries, well above 60% of total 
employment (Criscuolo et al., 2014). By taking a closer look at the age composition of small 
business, we notice that in Italy more than one-half of small companies are older than five 
years. Startups (i.e. firms aged less than 5 years) represent a minority of small businesses in 
OECD countries, but only Finland has a lower share of young firms than Italy (Criscuolo et 
al., 2014).1 
 Against this background, Law 221/2012 has been prompted by the Italian government to 
stimulate the new and young innovative startups employing high skilled personel thanks to 
targeted incentives to new enterpreneurial ventures. 
1.2 The Italian policy for innovative startups: rational and potential impact 
The primary goal of the Italian Law 221/2012 is "[...] to create favorable conditions for the 
establishment and the development of innovative enterprises to contribute significantly to 
economic growth and employment, especially youth employment." (Italian Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2014). The Law 221/2012 includes a set of support measures as 
listed in the “Restart, Italia!” report by the Minister of Economic Development.  
                                                 
1 Also Japan’s share of young companies is lower than in Italy, but Japanese data are only available at the 
establishment level, thus no direct comparison is possible. 
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The eligible enterprises are small newly incorporated companies headquartered in Italy, 
which have been operational for less than 5 years and with a yearly turnover lower than 5 
million Euros. According to the Law, innovative startups must develop and commercialize 
innovative products or services of high technological value, and they should fulfill at least 
one of the following criteria as reported in MiSE (2016)2: 
 at least 15% of the company’s expenses can be attributed to (R&D) activities;  
 at least 1/3 of the employees are PhD students, the holders of a PhD or researchers; 
alternatively, 2/3 of the total workforce must hold a Master’s degree; 
 the enterprise is the holder, depositary or licensee of a registered patent or software 
(intellectual property). 
As only a small group of young and upcoming enterprises accounts for the bulk of net job 
creation, Law 221/2012 targets incentives more specifically to those firms.  
In a nutshell, Law 221/2012 is meant to unleash financial constraints to help high growth 
potential firms to create new jobs in young innovative enterprises. Indeed, firms that meet all 
the criteria set by Law 221/2012 can register free of charge at a special register of “innovative 
startups” and are entitled to the benefits of the new legislative framework. This aspect of the 
policy is particularly important to evaluate the impact of the new legislation, since it rules out 
any risk of contamination of the treated group of firms: only registered firms get access to the 
benefits of the policy, with no exception. The main benefits for innovative startups can be 
divided into three categories: (a) tax incentives for equity investments; (b) a simplified 
procedure to get credit guarantees on bank loans; and (c) tailored made labor rules to 
subscribe fixed-term contracts which last up to four years. Investors in innovative startups get 
                                                 
2 Other minor requirements are: limited company, headquarter in Italy or headquarter in the EU with at least an 




a 30% tax credit as individuals and fiscal deduction as legal entities (as of 2016). As for 
credit guarantees, it covers  up to 80% of the bank loans and up to a maximum of 2.5 m EUR, 
and it is provided through a Government Fund called “Fondo Centrale di Garanzia.” When 
firms are no more eligible for the benefits of the policy, they exit the “innovative startup” 
register, and special treatments immediately stop. A report is published every year by the 
Italian Ministry of Industry, providing an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the policy, its 
impact and cost (see for instance MiSE, 2015). 
Since the main interventions are on equity investments, access to bank loans and 
employment, we will focus on whether this new policy has spurred equity collection, bank 
loans and creation of new jobs by startup firms, conditional upon survival. 
2 Data and descriptive statistics 
To evaluate the impacts of the program, we merge the participant data as published by the 
Ministry of Economic Development for the years 2013 to 2015 with firm-level (accounting) 
data from the AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk for the years 2008 to 2015.  
As the policy program is focused on startup companies, we restrict our sample to firms with 
similar characteristics of the treated ones. Namely, we analyze companies which were at most 
5 years old in 2013 or later3, and with revenues below 5 million EUR in at least one observed 
year.  
Moreover, we omit firms from highly regulated industries or industries with a high share 
of publicly owned firms, such as agriculture (NACE rev. 2 A industries), quarrying and 
mining (NACE rev. 2 B industries), utilities and waste management industries (NACE rev. 2 
D and E industries), as well as financial, bank, real estate, insurance industries4. Furthermore, 
                                                 
3 This fact implies that in the sample some firms are at most 7 years old.  
4 It is worth noticing that only 1% of program participants are active in these sectors, according to a report of Italian 
Chambers of Commerce, 4th quarter 2015.  
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we apply some outlier cleaning to the data to avoid that spurious results are due to potentially 
erroneous entries in the AIDA database. Accordingly, we remove from our sample all small 
firms with equity greater than 100,000 EUR, bank debts more than 500,000 EUR.  
Our initial sample consists of 89,834 Italian young, small enterprises including 1,569 
program participants. As we observe firms for multiple years, the resulting unbalanced panel 
contains 338,289 firm-year observations. 
Table 1 – Variable description 
VARIABLES Mean Min Max   
  
  
Equity (EUR, thousands) 17.343 0 100   
Bank debts (EUR, thousands) 25.774 0 500   
Employment 2.717 1 241   
Patent dummy 0.006 0 1   
R&D dummy 0.024 0 1   
Intangible dummy 0.687 0 1   
Age 2.382 0 7   
Survival 0.976 0 1   
 
In our sample the majority (almost of the 50%) of treated firms belong to only 2 sectors: 
“Computer programming, consultancy and related activities” and “Scientific R&D” (see Table 
2). Conversely, these two industries combined account for less than 4% of the untreated 
companies. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms across industries in some more detail. 
By looking at the geographic composition of our sample (Table 3), we notice that about 
one-fourth of the innovative startups are located in the two largest urban areas of Milan and 




Table 2 – The main industries in which treated firms are active 
NACE 2 Untreated Treated 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
62-Computer programming, consultancy and related 
activities 
2,808 3.18 510 32.50 
72-Scientific research and development 408 0.46 260 16.57 
63-Information service activities 1,960 2.22 122 7.78 
71-Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing 
and analysis 
2,056 2.33 75 4.78 
26- Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical 
products 
338 0.38 68 4.33 
74-Other professional, scientific and technical activities 2,780 3.15 65 4.14 
28- Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 815 0.92 63 4.02 
70-Activities of head offices; management consultancy 
activities 
4,483 5.08 52 3.31 
27-Manufacture of electrical equipment 490 0.56 33 2.10 
73-Advertising and market research 1,456 1.65 30 1.91 
Other industries 70671 80.07 291 18.59 
 
As preliminary evidence, Table 4 shows an increase in all the main variables of interest 
after treatment. The growth is particularly pronounced for debts and the number of employees 




Table 3 - The location of treated firms, top 10 NUT-3 regions 
NUTS-3 Italian regions Untreated Treated 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Milano (North Central Italy) 9,000 10.20 264 16.83 
Roma (North Central Italy) 14,238 16.13 153 9.75 
Torino (North Central Italy) 2,602 2.95 105 6.69 
Napoli (Southern Italy) 5,175 5.86 58 3.70 
Bologna (North Central Italy) 1,524 1.73 53 3.38 
Trento (North Central Italy) 591 0.67 51 3.25 
Firenze (North Central Italy) 1,530 1.73 40 2.55 
Bari (Southern Italy) 2,032 2.30 38 2.42 
Modena (North Central Italy) 996 1.13 37 2.36 
Padova (North Central Italy) 1,270 1.44 35 2.23 
TOTAL in North Central Italy 59,313 67.20 1,255 79.99 
TOTAL in Southern Italy 28,952 32.80 314 20.01 
Table 4 – Summary statistics for treated firms, before and after treatment 
 Before treatment After 1st year of treatment 
VARIABLES 
Obs. 819 before tr. / 1,473 after 1st y tr. 
Mean Min Max 
 
Mean  Min  Max  
   
Equity 17.612 0 100 19.364 0 100 
Debts 10.427 0 378  26.090  0 462 
Employment 1.418 1 18  2.039  1 26 
 
As common in treatment effects studies that utilize panel data, we can compare the before 
and after treatment values of outcome variables between the program participants and the 
control group as a descriptive preview on the difference-in-differences estimates that are 
presented in the subsequent econometric section.  
Typically, the difference-in-difference estimates are visualized by simply plotting the 
average values of the dependent variable before and after the treatment for the program 
participants and the control group in form of event-study graphs. In our situation, however, 
the reality of the data is more complex than the graphs that are usually presented in 
textbooks, because:  
10 
 
 instead of a law change that happens at a single point in time, our program participation 
is a staggered treatment, i.e. firms may start to enter the program from December 2012 
onwards, but can also enter at any later stage in time. This implies that the treatment 
status does not change in a single point in time but can change in years 2013, 2014 or 
2015 of our panel; 
 our panel is by construction unbalanced as firms can enter the program only until they 
are maximally five years old. Therefore, we only consider eligible companies in the 
first place, i.e. firms that were founded between 2008 and 2014. Therefore, any average 
of an outcome variable that we would compute will not be formed by the same 
companies in every year. Therefore, the average might vary in a not meaningful way 
due to entry.  
 the panel becomes unbalanced due to firm exits (attrition) and average values of the 
dependent variable might therefore be misleading as described above; 
 we cannot exactly time the control group accurately in comparison to the treatment 
group because of the staggered treatments and the various entry and exit years.  
While the subsequent regressions can be specified to account for these complexities, a simple 
event-study graph cannot encompass all these difficulties. Therefore, we only show some 
graphs for the sake of illustration that simplify the real data situation. Figure 1 therefore 
shows only parts of the data that is subsequently used in the regressions. In Figure 1, only 
data of the foundation cohort 2010 is shown, i.e. we have two pre-treatment periods. 
Furthermore, the data is limited to companies for which we observe at least five years of data 
until 2015. This means we exclude early exits that make the panel unbalanced. We plot the 
average of logs of the dependent variables equity, debt and employment and rescale the mean 
to be zero in 2012 for each time series in order to visualize the pretreatment trends and 
treatment trends as good as possible. 
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The graph shows a high effect in the treatment phase. The treated companies show a 
growth of equity of about 17% between the end of 2012 and 2015, whereas the control group 
has a relatively flat trend only growing about 2%. In the pre-treatment period, the two groups 
show quite similar trends between 2011 and 2012 but the equity drops by about 3% in the 
treatment group between 2010 and 2011, whereas it increases by about 2.5% in the control 
group during the same years. Thus, it is questionable whether the common trend assumption 
required for valid difference-in-difference regressions hold in the data. This will be tested in 
the subsequent econometric specification for the whole sample by including a pre-treatment 
dummy variable in the regressions. When the common trend assumption turns out to be 
violated, we apply conditional difference-in-differences models where we match the treated 
firms with comparable control firms. 
The same econometric methods will be applied to debt and employment. The raw data of 
the 2010 firm-foundation cohort shows that the treated companies experienced higher growth 
in both the treatment period and the pre-treatment phase. Therefore, an estimate of the 
treatment effect without further adjustments might be misleading as the growth in debt was 
already higher before the Start-up Act was effective. With respect to employment, the pre-
treatment trends are similar between 2011 and 2012 but the employment in untreated firms 
grew more between 2010 and 2011. In the treatment period, the employment of treated firms 
grows by about 30% but only about 5% in the control group. Again, more sophisticated 













































Note: The graph shows the data the foundation cohort 2010; only firms with at least five years of data. All firm-
level data were within-demeaned, and then averaged by treatment and control group, respectively. 
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3 Empirical strategy 
For the identification of policy effects, we mainly rely on (conditional) difference-in-
difference (DiD) regressions (see e.g. Heckman et al., 1997, 1998, Angrist & Pischke, 2009, 
2015). We compare equity, debt and employment of participating companies before and after 
the Startup Act of December 2012. To do that we must first identify a comparable set of non-
participing firms.  
 The DiD estimator is usually applied to situation where a policy affects a subpopulation 
of companies, e.g. all small and young firms in an economy. In that case, the firms cannot 
self-select into treatment. It is exogenously determined which firms are in the treatment group 
and which firms are in the control group. In our set-up, the firms can self-select into the 
treatment. This bears some potential bias in our estimation strategy, as the firms may have 
different participation probabilities. For instance, there might be some firms that expect less 
benefits from the program than others and therefore do not select into the program. These 
firms may not have a growth interest in the first place and are therefore not a good control 
group. In order to address the self-selection problem, we also conduct so-called conditional 
DiD estimations where we try to adjust the control group such that it has a similar 
participation likelihood as the treated firms. In that case, one would assume that the firms are 
either treated or not only because of purely random shocks. In practice, it means that we 
narrow the control group to become as similar as possible to the treatment group. 
 First, we consider all potentially eligible firms by size and age criteria. As tests will show, 
this control group does not fulfill the common trend assumption required for valid DiD 
estimates in all cases. Therefore, we construct more accurate control groups. As we cannot 
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observe all other eligibility criteria comprehensively5, we make use of propensity score 
matching techniques (cf. e.g. Heckman et al. 1997, 1998) to approximate eligibility and also 
the participation probability to the largest extent possible. As our econometric results will 
show, the matched control groups conform to the common trend assumption. 
 In our main analyses, we select our control group according to PSM. In more detail, the 
probit regression used to build the propensity score considers the presence of R&D 
expenditures measured by an R&D dummy variable, and also the presence of intangible 
assets and patent applications measured by two further dummy variables.6 In addition, we 
consider the geographical location and the firms’ industry differentiated by 12 sector 
dummies. As the common trend assumption was not fulfilled in all DiD regressions even 
after matching, we also considered lagged values before the treatment period of the 
dependent variables as matching criteria.  
 As further problem specific to panel data is attrition. Attrition leads to an unbalanced 
panel structure due to firm exits. If firm exits are disproportional between program 
participants and the control group, bias may be induced in the DiD estimates. We therefore 
explicitely model attrition by estimating survival regressions for each year as suggested e.g. 
in the textbook of Wooldridge (2010). We use the predictions of the survival regressions to 
compute annual, inverse mills ratios that we include as an additional regressor in the panel 
DiD models.  
As discussed in the literature, the standard errors in DiD applications might be biased because 
of autocorrelation and the so-called Moulton bias. We address this concern by clustering the 
                                                 
5 Among others, the eligibility criteria involve owning a patent or unique software or having an exclusive license, 
or an R&D intensity above 15% in terms of revenues, or at least 1/3rd of employees with Ph.D. degree or 2/3rds 
with master degree etc. (cf. subsection 1.2 for details).  
6 In case a firm is classified as an applicant, we set the patent dummy equal to 1 for the application year and all 




standard errors at a higher level (province level) than the observational unit, as recommended 
in the literature (see the discussion in Bertrand et al., 2004, or Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  
Our first DiD specification implemented as fixed effects panel regression is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∙ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  
with i= 1… N (firms) and t=2008…2015 (years).      (1) 
 
To estimate the impact of the policy we consider different dependent variables (yit): the 
natural logarithms of equity in thousands of Euros, bank loans in thousands of Euros, and the 
number of employees. Given our goal to evaluate the policy, our principal independent 
variable is represented by the treatment status (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡). We add a before treatment 
dummy (𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡) to test whether the hypothesis of common trend assumption holds. It has 
value 1 the year before the treatment, otherwise it is 0. Moreover, the post-treatment dummy 
(called 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡) is present to avoid that formerly treated firms are considered as never-treated 
ones in the post-treatment phase and to estimateif the policy effects continue after the 
treatment period. The post-treatment dummy takes the value 1 once the firm drops out of the 
program because it became too large, too old, or it loses some mandatory requirements for an 
innovative startup (this is recorded in the administrative program data). Finally, we insert a 
full set of time dummies (Xit) to control for macro-economics shocks that might affect all 
firms.  
 In addition, we propose extended specifications of our base model. As in the case of 
relevant attrition effects, it could happen that program participants are more or less likely to 
survive than non-treated firms. On the one hand, treated firms may be able to make riskier 
investment because of improved access to equity and loans. Failures of risky investment 
projects may increase the probability of bankruptcy and thus exit (relative to the control 
group). On the other hand, the improved access to capital may also allow the companies to 
implement their business plans appropriately which might not have been possible without the 
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program participation. As a result, firms with well implemented business plans might also 
survive longer. In order to account for attrition, we follow Wooldridge (2010: chapter 19) and 
estimated a series of probit regression on an indicator variable for survival. We estimate a 
cross-section probit model for each year t separately (always with the sample that was alive 
in t-1). From these probit models, we obtain the linear predictions and we calculate the 
inverse Mills ratio which is then included in the DiD regression as term accounting for 
attrition.  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾1 ∙ 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∙ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∙ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿 ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑖𝑡  
with i= 1… N (firms) and t= 2008…2015 (years).       (2) 
 
Finally, we re-estimate eq. (2) with matched samples constructed by PSM techniques.  
4 Results 
4.1 Baseline model 
In this Section, we show our baseline findings on the effects of the Startup Act. Since this law 
provides direct incentives on collecting equity, receiving bank loans and hiring people, we 
study the effects on these three variables.  
 As Table 5 shows we find positive treatment effects on all three dependent variables. The 
equity grows about 16% in the treated firms as response to the policy. The debt increases by 
about 76% and employment grows by about 18%.  
 The post-treatment dummy is also positive and significant in all cases. For instance, in the 
regression on equity it takes the value of about 11%. This would imply that the firms first 
manage to acquire 16% more equity as response to the policy (i.e. 16% more than they would 
have had if the policy would not have been introduced). Once the firm is no longer eligible to 
operate under the Italian start-up Act, e.g. because it became too large or too old, investors 
lose their tax benefits and as a consequence they could withdraw their equity. The post 
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treatment coefficient of 10.8, however, shows that the equity remains higher than in the 
period before treatment. A test does not reject that the post treatment marginal effect of 10.8 
is equal to the marginal effect of the treatment dummy which is 15.8. We thus conclude that 
we do not find a significant withdrawal of equity after the firm has to exit the Start-up Act 
program. The post treatment effects for debt and employment yield similar interpretations.  
 The test on common trends as indicated by the “before treatment” dummy variable is 
rejected in all cases, however. Thus, we conclude that these results may be affected by some 
bias. In order to remedy this situation, we consider further, more sophisticated estimation 
techniques. 
Table 5 – The impact of the policy of equity, bank loans, employment: DiD regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(equity) Ln(debt) Ln(employment) 
Treatment 0.158*** 0.758*** 0.182*** 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.024) 
Post-treatment 0.108** 0.599*** 0.206*** 
 (0.044) (0.206) (0.058) 
Before treatment 0.025* 0.220*** 0.047** 
 (0.014) (0.073) (0.019) 
Constant 2.502*** -0.448*** 0.466*** 
 (0.005) (0.059) (0.017) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 338,289 338,289 338,289 
Number of firms 89,834 89,834 89,834 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.2 DiD models accounting for attrition 
In this subsection, the DiD models account for attrition in the panel. Therefore, we estimated 
survival equations as suggested by Wooldridge (2010: chapter 19). These survival regressions 
are estimated for each year separately based on covariates of the preceding year. In the 
appendix, we present a pooled cross-sectional regression for all years to save some space. 
The annual versions of this regression are used to compute yearly mills ratios that are then 
used as an additional regressor in the DiD models to account for attrition.  
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Table 6 – The impact of the policy of equity, bank loans, employment: DiD regressions considering 
attrition  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(equity) Ln(debt) Ln(employment) 
Treatment 0.153*** 0.697*** 0.162*** 
 (0.019) (0.071) (0.024) 
Post-treatment 0.108** 0.596*** 0.205*** 
 (0.044) (0.204) (0.055) 
Before treatment 0.022 0.178** 0.033* 
 (0.015) (0.074) (0.019) 
Mills ratio -0.279*** -3.701*** -1.221*** 
 (0.022) (0.128) (0.055) 
Constant 2.499*** -0.498*** 0.449*** 
 (0.005) (0.061) (0.017) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 338,289 338,289 338,289 
Number of firms 89,834 89,834 89,834 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Table 6 shows the DiD results for the specification accounting for attrition. The mills 
ratio is negative and significant in all cases. In terms of the treatment effects, the coefficients 
reduce slightly. In other words, without correcting for attrition, we overestimated the effects 
in the initial DiD regressions. Adding the mills ratio also reduces the coefficients and 
statistical significance of the “before treatment” dummy which tests the common trend 
assumption. However, the common trend is still rejected in the regression of debt and also 
weakly in the model on employment. Therefore, we turn to the matched control group below.  
4.3 DiD models accounting for attrition using matched control groups 
In this subsection, we apply a Propensity Score Matching technique to control for the 
selection into treatment by firms. Specifically, our PSM considers intangible assets, a dummy 
for positive R&D expenses, a patent dummy, as well as sets of dummy variables for the 
foundation years, the sector and the location of the firm.  
 The patent dummy, the R&D dummy and the intangible assets are used to approximate 
the program’s eligibility criteria to the best possible extent. Intangible assets may be seen as a 
proxy of the presence of innovation activities. R&D expenditures are explicitly mentioned as 
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an eligibility criterion since it is required to have and R&D intensity of at least 15%. Being a 
patent applicant is linked with the criteria that required to be holder, depositary or licensee of 
at least one industrial property. Unfortunately, we cannot observe the exact R&D intensity, 
nor unique software or other licenses and we have no information on the qualification 
structure of the firm’s personnel. Even though this data may be available for the participant 
companies, it is not available for the control group that never applied for the program.  
 Finally, to refine the control group even further we also added lagged values of the 
outcome variables in pre-treatment periods in order to obtain common trends (if necessary)7.  
 The PSM is implemented as nearest neighbor matching with one nearest neighbor for 
each treated firm.  
 When using the Propensity Score Matching, we obtain that the estimated coefficient of 
the pre-treatment dummy is statistically insignificant in all models, i.e. the common trend 
assumptions are not violated. Furthermore, Table 7 shows that the policy has a positive and 
significant impact on all three outcome variables: equity, bank loans, and employment.  
 Even though the estimated treatment effects are highly statistically significant and 
positive, they are of moderate economic significance. One has to keep in mind that the 
program participants are very young start-up companies. They thus have very small factor 
endowments: on average, the treated companies had before the policy program existed or 
they participated an equity endowment of € 17,612, average debt of € 10,427 and 1.4 
employees. 
  
                                                 
7 In this baseline, we consider only firms founded before 2013 because of at least one year of pre-treatment is 
observed. Indeed, many firms established in 2013 and onwards born directly as “innovative start-ups”. 
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Table 7 – The impact of the policy of equity, bank loans, employment: DiD  regressions with 
matched control groups. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(equity) Ln(debt) Ln(employment) 
Treatment 0.105*** 0.415*** 0.117*** 
 (0.022) (0.098) (0.029) 
Post-treatment 0.043 0.218 0.100* 
 (0.070) (0.236) (0.053) 
Before-treatment 0.007 0.125 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.083) (0.021) 
Mills -0.542*** -3.211*** -0.458* 
 (0.163) (0.916) (0.256) 
Constant 2.712*** -0.997** 0.509*** 
 (0.053) (0.446) (0.086) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,251 6,416 6,349 
Number of firms 1,432 1,469 1,455 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 For equity, the estimated treatment effect amounts to a growth of 11.1% [=exp(0.105)-1]. 
In terms of real effects this implies that the equity grows as a result of the Italian Start-up Act 
from € 17,612 to € 19,549, or in other words an increase of € 1,937. The average debt 
increased by 51.4%, i.e. it changed from € 10,427 to € 15,790, and the average employment 
increased by about 1/5th of an employee (from 1.4 employees to 1.6 employees).  
 From the program implementation in December 2012 until the end of 2015, 5,145 firms 
had signed up for the program. In total, the program thus created about 926 more jobs in 
innovative start-up companies, and injected almost € 38 million of capital into these firms (in 
terms of equity and debt).  
 The DiD models also contain the post-treatment dummy. This would in principle allow to 
investigate whether the treatment effect is durable after the participants can no longer operate 
under the Start-up Act. However, the post-treatment dummy becomes insignificant in our 
matched samples. Given these imprecise estimates tests never reject that the post-treatment 
effects is equal to the treatment effect. However, more research with more data after the 
program exit seems warranted to verify these preliminary results on post treatment effects. 
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4.4 DiD models with heterogeneous treatment effects 
As robustness tests, we also estimated annual treatment effects. It could be that the treatment 
effect evolves over time as potential investors are not yet familiar with the program shortly 
after its introduction and this behave more conservative in the beginning.  
 We create three dummy variables: treatment2013, treatment2014, treatment2015 to see 
how the policy effects unfolded over the years. As we can observe in Table 8, the treatment 
effects intensify year by year. In the case of debts and employment, the treatment effect in 
2013 was insignificant. However, this growing trend may be due to the typical time lag 
needed to observe the actual impact of a new policy. For instance, in our case, firms need 
some months to collect equity, receive loans from banks or hiring people and the final 
outcome may not realize immediately.  
Table 8 - DID with attrition and matched samples: annual treatment effects  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(equity) Ln(debt) Ln(employment) 
Treatment2013 0.075*** 0.098 0.031 
 (0.023) (0.119) (0.026) 
Treatment2014 0.099*** 0.281** 0.084*** 
 (0.025) (0.108) (0.032) 
Treatment2015 0.149*** 0.911*** 0.256*** 
 (0.031) (0.127) (0.041) 
Post-treatment 0.052 0.297 0.124** 
 (0.070) (0.237) (0.050) 
Before treatment 0.005 0.094 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.083) (0.021) 
Mills ratio -0.717*** -5.295*** -1.005*** 
 (0.164) (0.963) (0.273) 
Constant 2.708*** -0.996** 0.514*** 
 (0.053) (0.450) (0.088) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,251 6,416 6,349 
Number of firms 1,432 1,469 1,455 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, in Table 9 we analyze the impact of the policy in the Northern and Southern regions 
of Italy. This historical gap between the more developed Northern area and the Southern part 
of Italy has been widening after the Great Recession. Specifically, the Northern part has a 
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developed economy. Conversely, the Southern part is a depressed region which often meets 
severe difficulties in growth, innovation and employment because it has an undeveloped 
infrastructure system, weak institutions and a fragile industrial base. To analyze the impact of 
the Startup Act in the two macro-areas, we repeat the treatment analysis with a dummy 
variable for firms located in the Southern part of the country (called ‘Mezzogiorno’, in Italian 
language). While the results’ table suggests that the treatment effects vary across regions, 
tests on differences in coefficients between the North and the South do not yield any 
statistical result. We thus conclude  that the policy works in both the Northern and the 
Southern regions of Italy.  
Table 8 - DID with attrition and matched samples: Northern and Southern Italy 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ln(equity) Ln(debt) Ln(employment) 
    
Treatment North 0.087*** 0.426*** 0.109*** 
 (0.026) (0.100) (0.028) 
Treatment South 0.192*** 0.362** 0.157** 
 (0.069) (0.146) (0.070) 
Post-treatment 0.040 0.220 0.099* 
 (0.070) (0.236) (0.053) 
Before treatment 0.007 0.125 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.084) (0.021) 
Mills ratio -0.536*** -3.214*** -0.455* 
 (0.160) (0.917) (0.256) 
Constant 2.712*** -0.997** 0.509*** 
 (0.053) (0.446) (0.087) 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,251 6,416 6,349 
Number of firms 1,432 1,469 1,455 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
5 Conclusions  
In our analysis we documented that the effect of Italian Startup Act (Law 221/2012) is 
positive along multiple dimensions by easing firms’ access to equity and debt capital. 
Specifically, tax benefits for new equity investors alleviate the problem of shortage in risk 
capital, since the estimated treatment effect is positive and statistically significant. The 
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Startup Act also contributes to access to bank loans by small and young enterprises. 
Following our results, we find that innovative startups have higher debt as a response to the 
program participation. We interpret this finding as better access to debt capital because of the 
public loan guarantees. 
Cost-Benefit-Analysis 
In total, our results suggest that the program had injected almost € 34 million in terms of 
equity and debt capital into Italian innovative start-up companies between the end of 2012 
and 2015.  
In addition, the program created more than 900 additional jobs because of more flexible labor 
market regulations for firms operating under the Italian Start-up Act.  
These benefits of the policy can be contrasted with the associated cost, i.e. forgone income 
tax revenues for the government as well as default loans for which the government had made 
guarantees towards the creditors:  
 In 2013, the total costs due to lower taxes is € 5.9 million (audited value) and € 0.5 in 
terms of loss for guaranteed loans (estimated value by the government).  
 In 2014, the total costs due to lower taxes is € 10.2 million (audited value) and 0.5 
million in terms of loss for guaranteed loans (estimated value).  
 For 2015 we do not have data for total cost, but inferring from new created start-up 
companies we could expect a total cost in terms of forgone taxes and loss due to 
guaranteed loans of € 11 / 12 million.  
This roughly corresponds to a total cost of € 29 million which would almost neutralize the 
capital injection of € 38 million in the total businesses. The policy thus mostly channels money 
that would have used for other purposes into small and young innovative companies. As this, 
however, promises some further options for economic growth in the future, it still seems to be 
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a policy with potential future benefits. In addition, more than 900 jobs were created in young 
innovative companies which would otherwise not have existed.  
 If one thus interprets the € 29 million cost for the government as a direct subsidy for the 
business sector, one could calculate that the creation of one job (for about 5 years at least) did 
cost the Italian taxpayer about € 32,000. This seems a justifiable amount for governmental job 
creation.  
Our results also contribute to a better understanding of the impact of similar startup policies 
which have been recently implemented in several countries around the world such as 
Belgium, India, and Latvia.  
 For future investigations, a number of questions seem highly interesting: in terms of the 
Italian start-up Act, it would be interesting to investigate with more recent data how durable 
the estimated treatment effects are. Even though we estimated post-treatment effects, our 
results were somewhat inconclusive. This possibly owes to a limited number of post-
treatment observations. With more recent data and thus more years elapsed after program 
participation, more reliable post-treatment effects could be estimated.  
 In addition, it would be worthwhile to explore to what extent the increased factor inputs 
in terms of capital and labor yield positive output effects in terms of sales or productivity 
growth. At time of writing this paper, the program was too recent to investigate output 
effects.  
 Finally, it would be interesting to compare the policy design of the Italian start-up Act to 
other international programs that also aim at (innovative) start-ups and to compare the effects 
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Probit model on program participation 
In order to select a matched control group, we employ a probit model on treatment status. We 
estimated cross-sectional models for each program cohort where the covariates stem from the 
last year before the firms may have entered the program. In particular, we consider an R&D 
dummy, a dummy for the presence of intangible assets, a dummy for the presence of at least 
one patent, the firm’s foundation year and its squared value to control for non-linearities, as 
well as sets of sector dummies and regional dummies. Moreover, we added pre-treatment 
values of the outcome variables, i.e. the logarithms of equity, debt and employment in levels 
as of 2012 the year before the policy was launched). Thus we match on the lagged levels of 
the outcome variables next to other exogenous covariates that determine the subsequent 
treatment probability. We also experimented with pre-treatment trends of the outcome 
variables (not shown in table). 
We find that the selection criteria such as R&D, intangible assets and the presence of at least 
one patent have the expected positive signs on future treatment probability and that these 
variables are also statistically significant (see column 3). The levels of debt and equity also 
show a positive sign in the regressions, but employment has a negative sign. This is to be 
expected as larger firms are more likely to not qualify for the start-up act because of the 




Table A.1 – Probit models on treatment status 
VARIABLES (2) (3) (4) 
Ln(debt) 0.026*** 0.034*** 0.017*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(employment)  -0.246*** -0.254*** 
  (0.018) (0.019) 
Ln(equity)  0.157*** 0.078*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
R&D (dummy)   0.586*** 
   (0.031) 
Intangible (dummy)   0.540*** 
   (0.029) 
Patent (dummy)   1.263*** 
   (0.050) 
Age -0.032 -0.063*** -0.088*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Age2 -0.049*** -0.047*** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant -2.730*** -2.842*** -3.140*** 
 (0.089) (0.094) (0.100) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 185,206 185,206 185,206 
Pseudo R-squared 0.310 0.323 0.372 
Loglikelihood -10708 -10497 -9744 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Survival effects and refining the control group 
As explained in the main body of the text, we control for attrition in the sample. The 
estimates of the program treatment effects might be biased if treated firms live significantly 
longer or die significantly earlier than the control group. In order to control for that, we 
estimate a set of survival equations. In order to construct a mills ratio as outlined in 
Wooldridge (2010: chapter 19), we estimate the survival models for each cross-section 
separately. In order to show the main regression results but save space, we print below 
regression results for the full sample using pooled cross-sectional data though. In the first 2 
regressions, it turns out that the treated firms are more likely to survive. This effect of the 
treatment status disappears, however, once we control for debt, equity and employment. This 
means the survival is not influenced by some (unobserved) program effect but by the fact that 





Table A.2 – Probit models on firm survival  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Treatment 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.063 0.080 0.014 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) 
Post-Treatment  -0.155 -0.122 -0.097 -0.158 
  (0.180) (0.180) (0.182) (0.184) 
Ln(debt)   0.052*** 0.039*** 0.030*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln(employment)    0.203*** 0.179*** 
    (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(equity)    0.030*** -0.002 
    (0.006) (0.007) 
R&D (dummy)     -0.016 
     (0.031) 
Intangible (dummy)     0.307*** 
     (0.011) 
Patent (dummy)     -0.075 
     (0.057) 
Age   -0.333*** -0.350*** -0.322*** 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Age2   0.037*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 1.765*** 1.765*** 2.276*** 2.009*** 1.861*** 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 335,661 335,661 335,661 335,661 335,661 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0603 0.0603 0.0837 0.0916 0.102 
Loglikelihood -35473 -35472 -34588 -34291 -33897 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Correlation among main variables 
As shown in the Table A.3, the correlation among different variables is usually low; the 
highest one (in absolute value) is 0.29 between Age and the R&D dummy which does not 
raise an concern about multicollinearity.  












Equity  1      
Bank debts  0.14    1     
Employment 0.04    0.11    1    
Patent (dummy) 0.02    0.001   -0.01    1   
R&D (dummy) 0.07    0.06    0.05    0.02    1  
Intangible 
(dummy) 
0.03    0.06    0.04    0.03    0.11 1 
Age 0.09    0.13   0.07  0.02  -0.29 0.06 
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